Concerning the strategic manipulability of the the stable matching produced by the Gale-Shapley algorithm, Kobayashi and Matsui recently considered the existence problem of a preference profile of women, that is, given a preference profile of men, find a preference profile of women that makes the Gale-Shapley algorithm produce the prescribed complete matching of men and women. Reformulating this problem by introducing the set of proposals to be made through the execution of the algorithm, and switching the roles of men and women, we consider the existence problem of a preference profile of men and show that the problem is reduced to a problem of checking if a directed graph is a rooted tree and it is solvable in polynomial time. We also show that the existence problem of preference profiles of both sexes when a set of proposals is given is solvable in polynomial time.
Introduction
Those who triggered this work are Tomomi Matsui, who presented his work concerning the strategic issue in the stable matching model, and Akihisa Tamura, who raised an incisive question for his presentation. Matsui's work has been published in [7] , where given a preference profile of men and a complete matching, they consider the problem of finding a preference profile of women such that the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm produces the given complete matching, and show that the problem is solvable in polynomial time. They also consider several variations of the problem in [8] , and show that one of them results in NP-completeness.
Suppose that given a preference profile of women and a complete matching, we are asked if there is a preference profile of men such that the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm produces the given complete matching. This problem has a trivial solution, that is, each man just has to rank his assigned mate first in his preference list. When we are given a preference profile of men, being given a complete matching is equivalent to being given the set of women to whom each man proposes to during the execution of the algorithm. Hence the problem that Kobayashi and Matsui consider in [7] , which is the first problem in [8] , can be restated as "given a preference profile of men and a set of proposals, find a preference profile of women such that during the execution of the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm each man proposes to women prescribed by the set of proposals." The aim of this paper is to answer the question what if we switch the roles of men and women in this setting. We will show that it reduces to a problem of determining if a directed graph is a rooted spanning tree, hence is solvable in polynomial time.
The issue of strategical manipulability in the stable matching model has been discussed in many publications such as [5] , [10] , and the references therein. To our knowledge, the above problem setting is novel and will serve as a foundation stone for further research on the strategical manipulability in the stable matching model. In the next section, we describe the stable matching problem and the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. In Section 3 we define the problem considered in this paper, and then in Section 4 introduce the keystone of this paper named second suitor graph. The solution as well as the polynomial solvability of the problem is shown in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss the existence of preference profiles of men and women when a set of proposals is prescribed.
Stable matching and men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm
We denote the set of men and the set of women by M and W , respectively, and suppose that they consist of the same number, say n, of persons, i.e., |M| = |W | = n. Each man has a totally ordered list of all the women, which we call his preference list, and each woman also has her preference list of all the men. We denote person u's preference list by L u . We denote v u v or v ≺ u v when v is ranked prior to v in L u , and v u v or v u v when v = v or v u v . We will use the symbols L u and u interchangeably. We also denote the set of preference lists of M and W by L M := [L m ] m∈M = [ m ] m∈M and L W := [L w ] w∈W = [ w ] w∈W , and call them preference profile of men and preference profile of women, respectively.
We say that f (u) is u's mate in f and {u, f (u)} is a matched pair in f . We say {m, w} with m ∈ M and w ∈ W is an unmatched pair in f when w = f (m). Gale and Shapley [4] showed that there is a stable matching for any given pair of preference profiles L M and L W . Their constructive proof is based on an algorithm now known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm which repeats a proposal followed by an engagement or a decline. The algorithm has two variations: men-proposing and women-proposing depending on which sex proposes to the other sex. The version we consider in this paper is the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm (mGS for short) described below, where k is the iteration counter which will be used in the proof of Lemma 5.
Men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm (mGS)
Step 0: Set F M := M, F W := W , Π = / 0, µ(u) = u for all u ∈ M ∪W , and k := 0.
Step 1: If F M = / 0, then output µ and Π , and stop.
Step 3 In the execution of the algorithm each person is either engaged or free. In the above description F M and F W are the sets of men and women who are free at the current iteration, respectively, and Π is the set of ordered pairs of man m and woman w such that m has proposed to w up to the current iteration. A man m who is free is chosen in Step 2, and then let him propose to his most favorite woman w whom he has not yet proposed to. If the woman w prefers the proposer m to her current mate m , she breaks her current engagement, sets her ex-mate m free and becomes engaged to m in Step 3.
Definition 4 For a given pair of preference profiles L M and L W , we denote the matching µ and the set of proposals Π that the mGS produces by µ(L M , L W ) and
It is known that the matching µ(L M , L W ) as well as the set of proposals Π (L M , L W ) is independent of the choice of a man m ∈ F M in Step 2. See Theorem 1.2.2 in Gusfield and Irving [5] or Lecture 2 in Knuth [6] .
We call P ⊆ M ×W a set of proposals when P M (m) and P W (w) are nonempty for all m ∈ M and w ∈ W .
Since each man proposes to women who are successively less preferred by him, and each woman who receives a proposal compares her current mate with the proposer and becomes engaged to a more favorite man, we readily obtain the following lemma.
where min m Π M (m) is the woman who is ranked lowest in the set Π M (m) according to man m's preference m , and max w Π W (w) is the man who is ranked highest in the set Π W (w) according to woman w's preference w .
Problem description
We consider the following problem in this paper.
Input :
A preference profile of women L W := [ w ] w∈W and a set of proposals
then output L M . Otherwise, return "none exists."
Now for given
for w ∈ W . If α(w) = α(w ) for different women w and w , the mGS would not produce P no matter what preference profile of men is given. Henceforth we assume that α : W → M is an injection, i.e.,
Since M and W are of the same cardinality, the woman w such that α(w) = m is uniquely determined for each m ∈ M, hence we denote it by α −1 (m). If the mGS produces P for some L M := [ m ] m∈M , it satisfies the conditions
Namely, the preference list of m should be as shown in Table 1 . Table 1 Man m's preference satisfying (3) and (4)
A natural question would be whether such a preference profile of men L M always gives the prescribed set of proposal P. In other words, "are the conditions (2) Table 2 , and P := { (1, a), (1, b) , (2, a), (2, b) }. The underlined elements denote the prescribed proposals P and the boldfaced figure in each row of L W is α(w), and the boldfaced alphabet in each row of L M is α −1 (m). Note that this instance satisfies the conditions (1), (2) , (3) and (4). The mGS, however, will produce Π (L M , L W ) = { (1, b), (2, a) }, which is different from the prescribed proposals P.
Definition 7 Let G(L W , P) be a directed bipartite graph with node set (M ∪ {r}) ∪W and arc set consisting of the following three disjoint arc sets:
We call G(L W , P) the second suitor graph for L W and P.
Definition 8 For an arc (u, v) of a directed graph, we call u and v endpoints of the arc, and we say that the arc emanates from node u and terminates at node v. The arc (u, v) is an outgoing arc of node u and an incoming arc of node v. The indegree of node u, denoted by indeg(u), is the number of incoming arcs of node u, and its outdegree, denoted by outdeg(u), is the number of outgoing arcs. Definition 9 A sequence of arcs a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a of a directed graph is said to be a path when ≥ 2, and a i has one endpoint in common with a i−1 and its other endpoint in common with a i+1 for i = 2, 3, . . . , − 1. A path is said to be a cycle when the two end nodes of the path are the same node. When arc a i+1 emanates from the node that a i terminates at for i = 1, 2, . . . , − 1, we call them a directed path and a directed cycle, respectively.
Example 2
The second suitor graph G(L W , P) for the preference profiles of Example 1 consists of two components: one being the root r alone, and the other being a directed cycle passing the nodes a, 1, b, 2 and a in this order.
Definition 10 A node v of a directed graph is called a root if all the nodes are reached by directed paths starting from v. A rooted spanning tree is defined as a spanning tree that has a root. For each node u of a rooted spanning tree, there is a unique directed path from the root to u. The number of arcs on this directed path is called the height of node u and denoted by h(u). The node right prior to u on this directed path is called a predecessor of u and denoted by pred(u), and the node right after u on this directed path is called a successor of u and denoted by succ(u).
The following lemma is among the equivalent characterizations of rooted spanning tree 1 given in Berge [1] .
Lemma 3 (Theorem 13 in Chapter 3, Berge [1]) A directed graph is a rooted spanning tree with root v if and only if
1. indeg(v) = 0, 2. indeg(u) = 1 for all nodes u = v, and 3. the graph contains no cycles.
Lemma 4 The second suitor graph G(L W , P) is a rooted spanning tree with root r if and only if it contains no directed cycles.
Proof Since the "only if" part is trivial, we prove the "if" part. Suppose G(L W , P) is not a rooted spanning tree. Then by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 it contains a cycle, say C. If C contains the root r, whose indegree is zero, C has a node whose indegree is more than one. This contradicts Lemma 2. Then the node set of C is contained in M ∪ W .
Since the indegrees are one for all the nodes of M ∪W by Lemma 2, this implies that the cycle C is a directed cycle.
Existence of men's preference profile
Lemma 5 Suppose that for a given set of proposals P ⊆ M × W there is a preference profile of men L M such that P = Π (L M , L W ). Then the second suitor graph G(L W , P) is a rooted spanning tree.
Proof We will show that the existence of a directed cycle in the second suitor graph G(L W , P) would lead to a contradiction. Denote a directed cycle by
Then m i = α(w i ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , and m i = β (w i+1 ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , − 1 and m = β (w 1 ) by the construction of G(L W , P). Let p i be the tally of the iteration counter k when m i proposed to w i , and let r i be the tally of k when m i−1 was rejected by w i in the execution of the mGS, where we use the convention that r 1 denotes the tally of k when m was rejected by w 1 . Then p i > r i+1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , − 1, p > r 1 , r i ≥ p i for i = 1, 2, . . . , .
The first and the second inequalities follow from (3) . The third inequality is due to the fact that w i rejects m i−1 = β (w i ) only because of the engagement to or the proposal from m i = α(w i ). Then we obtain
which is a contradiction.
Remark 1
The rotation in a complete matching, one of the key components introduced in [5] , should be defined as follows when the roles of men and women are switched. Let f denote a complete matching, and let
Then a sequence of matched pairs (w 0 , m 0 ), (w 1 , m 1 
with the convention that w r = w 0 . When the graph G(L W , P) contains a directed cycle (w 0 , m 0 ), (m 0 , w 1 ), (w 1 , m 1 ), . . . , (w r−1 , m r−1 ), (m r−1 , w 0 ), we will see that the reverse sequence (w r−1 , m r−1 ), (w r−2 , m r−2 ), . . . , (w 1 , m 1 ), (w 0 , m 0 ) of woman-man pairs corresponds to a rotation in the complete matching α −1 . Since we lack men's preference profile L M , we replace the condition w m f (m) in the definition of s f (w) by w ∈ P M (m)\{α −1 (m)}. Note that this condition is equivalent to m ∈ P W (w)\{α(w)}.
By the construction of the second suitor graph G(L W , P),
which means that m i = s f (w i ). Hence we obtain
Now suppose that we are given L W and P such that the second suitor graph G(L W , P) is a rooted spanning tree. Then indeg(m) = 1 for each node m ∈ M, that is, α(w) = α(w ) whenever w = w . Therefore the mappingf : M ∪W → M ∪W defined as follows is a complete matching:
Note that α −1 (m) = pred(m), the predecessor of m in G(L W , P). For the complete matchingf defined above, let L * M = [ * m ] m∈M be an arbitrary preference profile of men satisfying the following two conditions (compare with Table 1) :
Lemma 6 Suppose that the second suitor graph G(L W , P) is a rooted spanning tree. Let L * M := [ * m ] m∈M be a preference profile of men satisfying the conditions (5) and (6) , and let f * := µ(L * M , L W ). Then it holds that
implies w ∈ P M (m * ). Then by (6) we havê
Existence of preference profiles of men and women
We have considered the existence problem of a preference profile of men L M when a preference profile of women L W and a set of proposals P are given in the preceding sections. A natural question to pose would be whether there is a pair of L M and L W that makes the mGS produce P and/or a complete matching f . We will first show in the following subsection that the problem is solvable in polynomial time when f as well as P is given. Then we will show it is still polynomially solvable when P alone is given. Proof The second suitor graph G(L W , Π (L M , L W )) is a rooted spanning tree by Theorem 1. Then, by the same theorem, the mGS produces Π (L M , L W ) as well as µ(L M , L W ) for any preference profile of men L * M satisfying (7) .
Now suppose that we are given a complete matching f and a set of proposals P such that 
Now let L * M be an arbitrary preference profile of men satisfying (9) , and consider the existence problem of Kobayashi and Matsui [7] or the first problem in [8] . If their polynomial time algorithm provides a preference profile of women L * W that together with L * M makes the mGS produce f , we are done. If not, by Corollary 1 we conclude that there are no preference profiles of women for any preference profile of men satisfying (9) . Namely, no pairs of preference profiles of men and women make the mGS produce the prescribed complete matching f or the prescribed set of proposals P. Thus we obtain the following theorem. Now suppose that the graph H(P) has a spanning tree T satisfying the degree constraint (10) . Give orientations to the edges of T so that it becomes a rooted spanning tree with r as the root. We denote this rooted spanning tree by T * . Then indeg(w) = outdeg(w) = 1 for each w ∈ W , hence its predecessor pred(w) and successor succ(w) in T * are uniquely determined. Now let * w denote an arbitrary preference list of w ∈ W satisfying
and collect them to make a preference profile of women, which we will denote by L * W .
Lemma 8 If H(P) has a spanning tree satisfying the degree constraint (10) , then there is a pair of L M and L W such that Π (L M , L W ) = P.
Proof As discussed above, the second suitor graph G(L * W , P) turns out to be a rooted spanning tree for the preference profile of women L * W being a collection of preference lists * w satisfying (11) and the given set of proposals P. Then by Theorem 1 there is a preference profile of men L M such that Π (L M , L * W ) = P.
The problem of fining a degree-constrained spanning tree T in the graph H(P) reduces to a matroid intersection problem of two matroids defined on E. One matroid is the graphic matroid, whose independent sets are cycle-free sets of edges; the other is the partition matroid, where a subset I of E is independent if and only if |I ∩ δ (w)| ≤ 2 for all w ∈ W .
Clearly, a common basis, if any, is a spanning tree of H(P) satisfying the degree constraint (10), and vice versa. Theorem 3 Given a set of proposals P, the existence problem of a pair of L M and L W such that Π (L M , L W ) = P is solvable in polynomial time.
Proof Since the matroid intersection problem of a graphic matroid and a partition matroid is solvable in polynomial time, we obtain the theorem.
See [2] , [3] and [9] for algorithms for the matroid intersection problem and their computational complexity.
Conclusion
According to [8] , one of the open questions as to the strategic manipulability in the stable matching model is described as "given a pair of preference profiles L M and L W , is there a preference profile of women K W such that µ(L M , K W ) is a stable matching with respect to L M and L W and is different from the pessimal stable matching µ(L M , L W )?" Switching the roles of men and women yields a question "is there a preference profile of men K M such that µ(K M , L W ) is a stable matching with respect to L M and L W and is different from µ(L M , L W )?" It would be satisfying if the results in this paper make a dent in these problems.
